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Abstract
Repatriates’ experience and knowledge is
important competition advantage for the parent
company in international business. This paper
discussed repatriates’ incentive mechanism based
on the perspective of knowledge transfer,
established theoretic model of repatriates’
knowledge transfer incentive mechanism, and
pointed out that knowledge transfer was a process
of repeated game between the parent company and
the repatriates, the establishing of knowledge
transfer incentive mechanism was trying to reach
the equilibrium of the game, it provided theoretic
basis for promoting repatriates’ knowledge transfer
effectively.
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Introduction
Given the globalization of economies, the number
of the expatriates is on an upward trend,
consequently, repatriates management has been
paying more attention. For a long time, researches
from home and abroad always put emphasis on
repatriates’ welfare and demand satisfaction from
the perspective of cross-culture management.
However, there is a neglected problem, what effect
repatriates’ uncoded knowledge and the implication
of that knowledge will have on increasing the level
of the knowledge and enhancing the development
of company. In practice, the result is that the
repatriates choose to leave the company for they
can’t bring their ability into play, accompanied with
the companies’ lose for the spillage of knowledge.
This paper solved this problem discussed above, it
explored the repatriates’ incentive problem under
knowledge transfer, in order to improve strategy
consciousness for knowledge transfer, and provided
theory evidence for establishing reasonable
repatriates’ incentive mechanism.

Repatriates: knowledge assets attribute
Repatriates is not only a key resource to the
knowledge about the host country’s market and
economy, but also the important channel for
transferring the knowledge across nations, they are
the company’s vital human capital. Usually,

repatriates will gain five kinds of knowledge during
their overseas assignments: First, market related
knowledge. Antal and Martin pointed out
respectively that market related knowledge is a
necessary condition for a company to operating
successfully in a given market[1][2]. Under
different circumstance, repatriates will learn to
understand the new environment, they can gain the
knowledge relate to the given market, such as local
language, custom and business operating modes.
Second, personal skills. These individual skills
have a wide range, such as cross-culture , openness,
confidence, flexibility and tolerance. Mayhofe and
Adler indicated the improvement of repatriates’
these kinds of skills[3][4]. Third, managerial skills
related to job. For the different working
environment, repatriates should improve their
managerial skills. Downes and Thomas manifested
that
their
communication
skills,
project
management skills and problem-solving skills will
all be improved[5]. Fourth, network knowledge.
Adler and Martin showed that repatriates’ social
network will be established and extended. When
they are doing business in the host county, they will
interact with lots of local and foreign people, then
their social network will be established, they can
also extend their network in parent country. Fifth,
general managerial knowledge. This kind of
knowledge will help them become the candidates
for senior management positions.
Concerning the five kinds of knowledge,
comparatively speaking, some of them can be
coded and transferred to company’s employees
easily, such as market related knowledge, they are
called explicit knowledge. Some can be transferred
partly, such as network knowledge, however, others
can be transferred hardly or not, for instance,
personal skills, job related managerial skills and so
on, they are called tacit knowledge. In order to get
benefits from the knowledge, the company should
put emphasis on repatriates management and
motivation, and promote their knowledge transfer
to the company. The useful knowledge which was
arising from and be transferred by the repatriates,
can be seen as valuable asset which is hard to copy,
company can preserve and develop this kind of
asset, and transfer it into rare competitive
advantages in competition between companies,
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which is impossible to imitate. However, if the
company can’t be aware of the value of repatriates’
knowledge, or apply the assets without appropriate
human resource policies and practice, it will lead to
knowledge spillage, then the under-valued asset
will bring lose to the company in global
competition. Therefore, the importance of the
repatriates’ asset attribute should be well
appreciated.

Characteristics, process and cost of
repatriates’ knowledge transfer
1.Characteristics of repatriates’ knowledge
transfer
In terms of the analysis about the repatriates＇
knowledge asset attribute above, we can indicate
that knowledge transfer consist of explicit
knowledge transfer and tacit knowledge transfer.
Market related knowledge is explicit knowledge，it
can be exchanged between individual employees
easily, while something like personal skills, or job
related managerial skills, which is hard to code,
express or formulate, can not be transferred easily.
Therefore, in order to enhance knowledge transfer
effectively, we should focus on understanding the
characteristics of tacit knowledge, these
characteristics can be summarized as [6]: (1)
Implicitness ： Knowledge acquisition needs
personal to experience, practice and understand. (2)
Exclusivity: Individuals take the gained knowledge
as a part of status and self-worth, so usually they do
not want to share it with others free of charge. (3)
Situation: Tacit knowledge is different when
situation changes. (4) Accountability: Personal
knowledge is directly related to personal
performance in company, which determines the
wealth and status individual will get.
(5)Contribution: Personal knowledge forms
organization’s knowledge, which is the basis of
company’s sustainable competitive advantages, and
will contribute to the competitiveness of the
company.
2.Process of knowledge transfer
The process of repatriates transferring their
knowledge to parent company’s employees is the
basis of company’s knowledge transfer. Based on
Szulanski about knowledge transfer process model
and Alice Lam about knowledge transfer situation
model[7][8], this study established repatriates’
knowledge transfer process model as following
(see graph 1)

3. Cost of knowledge transfer
Knowledge transfer is defined as the process that
the sender transfers the knowledge to the recipient,
and should make sure that the recipient understand
and accept the knowledge. Knowledge transfer
process involves factors as knowledge sender,
content of the knowledge, knowledge transfer
channel and knowledge recipient, all these factors
will directly affect the transfer cost [9]. Costs of
repatriates’ knowledge transfer include:
（1） Cognitive cost. Cognitive cost is the
result of the unsuccessful mutual understanding
between sender and recipient, which will lead to
lose of knowledge. The level of cognitive cost will
be affected by the content of knowledge,
knowledge
transfer
channel,
organization
characteristics of both sender and recipient, willing
to transfer and experience of knowledge transfer.
When the degree of tacitness of the knowledge is
high, or the transfer channel being used can’t be
understand easily, or knowledge characteristics has
been changed by the characteristics of parent
company or the unmatch of different company
units, or when repatriates lack willing and
experience to transfer, the cognitive cost will be
increased.
（ 2 ） Opportunism cost. For repatriates,
before knowledge transfer, potential knowledge
recipient is unknown, so if the knowledge has been
transferred successfully, the potential recipient
don’t have to pay for it, moreover, they can resell
the knowledge with no marginal costs, if parent
company don’t have any scientific incentive or
preserve mechanism, this kind of knowledge
exchange will increase the cost of repatriates’
knowledge transfer. In addition, repatriates will be
glad to see the fact that parent company relies on
their knowledge, it means they can gain more value,
and enhance their position in company, therefore,
this motive to accumulate knowledge personally
will hamper the share of knowledge, finally
increase the cost of knowledge transfer.
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Design the repatriates’ knowledge
transfer incentive mechanism
1 .Design principle
According to the above analysis about
characteristics of repatriates’ knowledge transfer,
we can analyze the existence of cognitive cost and
opportunism cost of knowledge transfer cause
obstacles in knowledge transfer especially tacit
knowledge transfer. In order to reduce these
obstacles, the company must establish the incentive
mechanism to promote the knowledge transfer.
Based on incentive theories, incentive is divided
into intrinsic incentive and extrinsic incentive.
Intrinsic incentive is brought by the job itself
including the sense of interesting, achievement,
responsibility and so on, and it performs as
self-realization. Extrinsic incentive is the rewards
except job, including the increase in remuneration,
the promotion, and the improvement of
interpersonal relationship and so on. If the intrinsic
incentive and extrinsic incentive are the mutual
independence and the additive relationship,
dividing the intrinsic incentive and extrinsic
incentive, corresponding to the division of the labor
psychology that shows the concerning for intrinsic
incentive and economic psychology that shows the
concerning for extrinsic incentive, the company can
manage according to their relative strengths and
weaknesses to improve the incentive effect,
however, theoretical research result indicates that
under the existence of intrinsic incentive, these two
kinds of incentive can exchange, namely there will
have the mutual crowding effect [10]. In
accordance with the economic principle, the
company pays remuneration based on the staff’s
marginal productivity, and the reliance on extrinsic
incentive is more than on intrinsic incentive, the
ideal extrinsic incentive system strictly obeyed the
performance to pays remuneration, however,
because of the existing of the incentive mutual
crowding effect, all kinds of extrinsic incentive
based on paying remuneration by performance
strictly often has non-efficient behaviors in the
circumstance of high intrinsic incentive, while
intrinsic incentive has more advantage of
overcoming the cognitive cost and opportunism
cost in the process of improving tacit knowledge
transfer. Therefore, incentive mechanism model in
this paper is established in the theoretical analysis
above.
2. Theory model of repatriates’ knowledge
transfer
The repatriates’ knowledge transfer is the process
of transfer their valuable knowledge from overseas
to the parent company staff which involves two or
more employees. Their knowledge transfer can
affect the parent company staff’s behaviors, and

can be restricted by parent company staff’s
behaviors simultaneously. Knowledge transfer is
the dynamic game process between repatriates and
the parent company staff, so the construction of
knowledge transfer incentive mechanism is a
balanced outcome of the two side game actions.
Assuming that both of repatriates and parent
company staff are the rational decision-making
subject, they pursue maximization of individual
income and their strategies are knowledge transfer
or not. The value of repatriate A and parent
company employee B is W A1 and WB1
respectively, their knowledge absorptive capability
coefficient is a A （ 0< a A ≤ 1 ） and a B
（0< a B ≤ 1 ）separately. New value produced after
the knowledge transfer is W A 2 and W B 2 , and
the sender’s negative effect brought by the
knowledge transfer is W A3 and. W B 3 .
To simplify the question analysis, assuming
that repatriates and parent company staff have the
same value and absorptive capability, that means
W A1 = W B1 = W1 , a A = a B = a , then the value
produced after the knowledge transfer is the same
as the sender’s negative effect brought by the
knowledge
transfer
,
namely
W A 2 = W B 2 = W2 and W A3 = WB 3 = W3 .
Because repatriates may have game with
many different employees in parent company, this
constitutes repeated game and its game payoff
matrix is shown as following graph 2:

As to the parent company which want to
promote effective knowledge transfer, to establish a
rational incentive mechanism means to make the
repeated game above to sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium, at this time, repatriates A begins to
choose knowledge transfer and continue to choose
knowledge transfer, while once A doesn’t choose
knowledge transfer, he will choose non-transfer
forever. Similarly, if repatriates A choose
knowledge transfer, parent company employee B
will also choose knowledge transfer. Otherwise, if
repatriates A once chose non-transfer, parent
company employee B will always choose
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non-transfer. In this case, (transfer, transfer) is sub
game perfect Nash equilibrium, and each employee
obtains the income is (1 + a )W1 + W2 − W3 .
Specifically, assumed the discount factor
is δ , then we analyze repatriates A’s selection
strategy. If employee A chose non-transfer in a
certain game stage, his income in this stage
is (1 + a )W1 + W2 , but his behavior would trigger
B’s “never transfer” punishment, so A’s income of
every subsequent stage is W1 . If A chose
knowledge transfer, his income in this stage is
(1 + a)W1 + W2 − W3 , because the both sides
have knowledge transfer, the income of follow-up
knowledge
transfer
process
is (1 + a )W1 + W2 − W3 ,and the more times of
repeated game , the more income. If the repeated
times are many enough to make total income meet
the equation as follow:
(1 + a)W1 + W2 + δW1 + δ 2W1 + δ 3W1 + ...... = (1 + a)W1 + W2 + δW1 /(1 − δ )

Then knowledge transfer is A’s optimal choice .
So, if meets the following conditions:
WA = (1 + a ) W 1 + W

2

+ δ W 1 /( 1 − δ )

(1)
WB = (1 + a)W1 + W2 −W3 + δ ((1 + a)W1 + W2 −W3 ) + δ 2 ((1+ a)W1 + W2 − W3 )
+ δ 3 ((1 + a)W1 + W2 − W3 ) + ......

(2)
WA ≤ WB

(3)
There is

δ ≥ W3 /(aW1 + W2 )

(4)

That is, when the discount factor is big
enough and bigger than , A will choose knowledge
transfer.
As to B, assumed δ ≥ W3 /( aW1 + W2 ) ,
because B concerned the income of a certain stage,
and when only he expected that A would continue
to choose the knowledge transfer, B would choose
the knowledge transfer. Because B expected A once
chose transfer and continues to choose the
knowledge transfer, the knowledge transfer is the
optimal choice of B, otherwise, if A once chose
non-transfer, B would never have knowledge
transfer with A.
From the above analysis, it shows that,
if δ ≥ W3 /( aW1 + W2 ) , (transfer, transfer) is a
sub game perfect Nash equilibrium in the repeated
game between repatriates and parent company staff,
and Pareto optimality (transfer, transfer) is every
stage’s equilibrium result, namely, they must give
up the short-term income to obtain long-term
income, so the staff choose the knowledge transfer
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and realize a win-win situation.
3. Discussion on theoretical model’s application
The principle of the construction of above incentive
mechanism model lied in after introducing the
repeated game, the staff within organization
considers about the discount factor of the total
income rather than once income. As long as the
discount factor of future income is big enough, the
effective knowledge transfer can be achieved and
maintained by the repeated game. This means the
bigger long-term income of staff within
organization, the more choice of knowledge
transfer between employees. However, in reality,
the company may face a lot of complex situations
in promoting the effective repatriates’ knowledge
transfer which can affect the realization to the ideal
equilibrium state. Analysis as follows:
(1) The internal situation of parent company,
the characteristics of both sides in knowledge
transfer and the different transfer channels required
by the explicit and tacit knowledge can format the
obstacles in the proceed of knowledge transfer and
increase the cognitive cost of knowledge transfer
which may cause repatriates and parent company
staff to choose “ knowledge non-transfer
behaviors”.
(2) The most difficulties in repatriates’
knowledge transfer are obstacles of tacit
knowledge transfer, which bring about the
characteristics of tacit knowledge including
exclusivity, accountability and contribution which
can increase the opportunism cost of knowledge
transfer and cause repatriates and parent company
staff to choose “knowledge non-transfer
behaviors”.
(3) The repeated game model cannot realize
sometimes in the real word for situational factors, if
the company pays less attention on the intrinsic
incentive and doesn’t build the awareness of
long-term incentive mechanism of knowledge
transfer, it also can lead to both of repatriates and
parent company staff choose ” knowledge
non-transfer behaviors”.

Conclusions
Repatriates are very valuable knowledge assets to
parent company, however, only when their
knowledge can be transferred, these assets can play
their roles. Based on the above, the parent company
must establish the effective repeated game
mechanism. And this mechanism can have impact
of the staff’s choice and produce the optimal
solution, namely, achieving the sharing purposes in
the knowledge transfer. Therefore, the following
measures must be taken:
(1)Making
the
repatriates’
career
planning.The parent company should have a
complete career planning about repatriates,
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including: the expatriate assignments’ nature,
characteristics, time-span; the selection and
training of expatriates; all kinds of problems may
faced during the expatriate work period; the
commutation
with
parent
company;
the
arrangements after they returning and so on,
especially the strengthen for the repatriates’
planning and management, so that when they return
after finishing the assignments, they can adapt the
work in parent company more quickly, have a good
expectation to using their knowledge and
experience, and be willing to carry on knowledge
transfer to parent company.
(2) Establishing the knowledge transfer and
sharing environment.The parent company must
establish the knowledge environment which all of
employees are willing to transfer and share
knowledge to increase the discount factor of
repeated game. Specifically, that is to strengthen
the mutual communication among the staff so that
the staff can fully realize the importance of
knowledge transfer. The company must pay
attention on the incentive of staff’s knowledge
transfer and sharing behaviors, such as establishing
the incentive systems including the knowledge
salary payment system, knowledge promotion
system and knowledge training system.
(3) Strengthening the effect on tacit
knowledge transfer by the intrinsic incentive. On
the one hand, the tacit knowledge is often
accompanied by the team’s creative work and its
complexity and difficulty makes the participants
believe completion of the task itself is a kind of
incentive and challenge. At this time, the parent
company can increase the intrinsic incentive to
enhance
the
participants’
learning
and
communication capacity and to promote the
sharing knowledge in the team. On the other hand,
because the tacit knowledge is difficult to be
monitor ed and to be evaluated which make the
extrinsic incentive often be ineffective. So parent
company should rely on the intrinsic incentive to
form the staff’s self-restricting mechanism which
can promote the tacit knowledge separated from the
supervisor and carried on transfer spontaneously,
thus it will enhance the validity of knowledge
transfer.
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